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A single pull request could have handed attackers the keys to Microsoft’s software supply chain

Source: CSO Online · Published · Last checked 1 hour ago · 3 min read
A single pull request could have handed attackers the keys to Microsoft’s software supply chain
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Publisher excerpt From CSO Online

The most dangerous actor in a software supply chain may now be an automated script with powerful credentials and no idea where it’s sending them. Researchers from pen-testing company Cycode have discovered a now patched critical zero-click supply chain vulnerability in the open-source Windows Package Manager (WinGet), which sits on billions of devices worldwide. A single pull request could have tricked Microsoft’s internal tooling into freely handing over a moderator’s GitHub access token, with no phishing, no malware, no moderator clicking or approval required. There is currently no evidence that the flaw has been exploited in the wild. But it serves as a cautionary tale for enterprises that the automation they trust is becoming an attacker entry point, and package repositories are particularly enticing targets. “Package registries have become the highest-profile target in the software supply chain,” Moriel Harush, Cycode security research lead, wrote in a blog post. “Compromise a single maintainer, and you reach everyone who trusts them. Compromise the gatekeepers, and you reach the entire ecosystem.” Whatever the employee can do, the attacker can do WinGet is Microsoft’s free, open source command line tool that helps users discover, install, upgrade, configure, and remove apps. It exists on more than 1.4 billion active devices running Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server 2025. WinGet’s catalog is a public GitHub repository, and its gatekeeper, so to speak, is a small, official group of Microsoft moderators who review a constant stream of community pull requests and proposed changes. By default, WinGet installations on every Windows machine trust the actions those keepers take. The hole is in the moderators’ own internal triage tool. This PowerShell helper attached the moderator’s secret GitHub Personal Access Token (PAT) to any HTTP request, without checking who owned that address. This meant an attacker merely had to supply an address. Theoretically, if they opened a pull request and pointed an InstallerURL software installation package at their own server, “the trap was set,” Harush explained. Microsoft’s automated Azure DevOps validation pipeline would then attempt to fetch the URL, but the attacker’s server would intentionally return an error. This added a validation error label to the pull request. The moderator’s internal script would respond to that label by running a CheckInstaller routine which would send a HEAD request to the attacker via an authenticated HTTP helper, whose job is to automatically attach credentials or tokens to outgoing HTTP requests and handle authorization errors. Then all the attacker had to do was check their logs and extract the moderator’s official GitHub token, which was “casually” handed over. But the token is not merely a repository-scoped credential, it is a full identity credential, meaning whatever that Microsoft employee can do on GitHub, the token can do. Harush explained: “It is l…

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Reference: CSO Online — www.csoonline.com ↗

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